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ABSTRZCT
Evidenceof excess volatilities of asset prices compared with those of
market fundamentals is often attributed to speculative bubbles. This study
examines the sense in which speculative bubbles could in theory lead to excess
volatility, hut it demonstrates that some of the variance hounds evidence
reported to date precludes bubbles as a reason why asset prices might violate
such hounds. The findings must represent some other model misspecffication or
market inefficiency. One important misspecification occurs when the
researcher incorrectly specifies the time series properties of market
fundamentals. A bubble—free example economy characterized by a potential
switch in government policies produces paths of asset prices that would
appear, to an unwary researcher, to contain bubbles.
Robert P. Flood Robert J. Hodrick
flepartment of Economics Kellogg Graduate School
Northwestern University of Management
Evanston, IL 60201 Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60201—1—
The introduction and use of variance hounds tests by financial economists
interested in asset pricing and market efficiency has generated considerable
controversy. The first tests postulated a simple model in which market
efficiency required assets to have a constant expected real rate of return.
The apparent strong rejection of this hypothesis in the work of Shiller
(l9Rla, 1981h) and particularly Grossman and Shiller (1981) was followed
quickly by a number of different responses. The statistical properties of the
tests in small samples and the time series assumptions of the data were
criticized)- Substantial resources have also been devotedto complications of
the model that allow time variation in discount rates and risk premiums, while
remaining within the representative agent pardigm.2 Others have taken the
performance of the simple model and the excess volatility of asset prices
described in the tests to be indicative of market inefficiency.
One particular type of market inefficiency that receives much attention
in these discussions is that asset markets may be characterized by speculative
bubbles. Representative of these statements is Ackley's (193, p. 13)
discussion of Shiller's (1981a, 1981h) findings, in which he states, "But,
surely, it is possible that speculative price bubbles, upward or downward,
.,supplypart of the explanation." Similarly, in Fischer's (1q84, p. 500)
discussion of SMiler (1984', he states, "Backing up that empirical evidence
was the development, by Shiller and others, of the theory of speculative
bubbles, providing a reason that prices could fluctuate excessively without
smart investors being able to profit from knowing they were living in a
bubble." Similar statements have been made by others in discussions of stock
price volatility and in discussions of the volatility of foreign exchange
rates—2—
In this paper we examine whether some of the variance hounds tests
reported to date can he evidence for the hypothesis that asset prices contain
speculative bubbles. The speculative bubbles discussed here are of the type
studied by Flood and Garber (1980) and Blanchard and Watson (1982). The
variance bounds tests we discuss are of the types that were conducted by
Shiller (1981a, 1°81h, 1982, 1984) and l4ankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) and
that were discussed by Grossman and Shilier (1981). We demonstrate the sense
in which the existence of bubbles can in theory lead to excess volatility of
asset prices relative to the volatility of market fundamentals, hut we explain
why certain variants of variance bounds tests preclude hubbies as a reason why
asset prices might violate such hounds. This result, without its formal
demonstration, is mentioned by Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985, p. 681) who
state, "the inequalities ...holdeven if there are bubbles." Since many
researchers have mentioned bubbles as a possible reason for the failure of the
simple rational expectations model in variance bounds tests, we thought it
worthwhile to elaborate on the remark in Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985).
The issue turns on how one measures the inherently unobservable construct
that Shiller (1981a) denoted the ex post rational price. If one uses the
sample's terminal market price to construct a measurable counterpart to ex
post rational price, as is done by Shiller (1982, 1984), Grossman and Shiller
(1981) and Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985), failure of a variance bounds test
cannot he attributed to the existence of speculative bubbles. The reason is
that use of the sample market price effectively builds bubbles into the null
hypothesis. Rejection of the null must consequently he due to other
sources. Potential explanations include small sample properties of the tests,
general misspecification of the model and failure of the data to satisfy the
ergodicity assumption implicit in the use of the statistics.4—3—
In bubble research one particularly important misspecification of the
model occurs when the researcher incorrectly specifies the time series
properties of market fundamentals. The second purpose of this paper is to
explain, in terms of a simple model economy, how anticipated changes in market
fundamentals may produce asset price paths that would appear to an empirical
researcher, who is unaware of the potential change, to he characterized by
bubbles even though the economy is bubble free. The exampleeconomy is
described by a potential change in government policies that we label a process
switch.
Our presentation is in the next two sections. In section II we describe
a common asset pricing model and show how it responds to variance hounds tests
when hubbies are present. In Section III we develop our exampleeconomy and
explore possible process switches as explanations of bubble type phenomena.
Section IV contains some concluding remarks.
TI. Variance Bounds Tests of An Asset Pricing Model
Most variance hounds tests examine present value relations that are
derived from a representative consumer's optimization problem. Ifat is the
real dividend of an asset at time t andz is the real price ex—dividend on
the asset at time t, a typical first order condition of a representative agent
requires
(1) Pt =PE(P+i+
where Pt U'(c)z, d E U'(c'a, U'(c) is the marginal utility of
consumption at time t, p is the fixed discount factor of the agent
and E(.) is the conditional expectation operator based on all time t—4—
information. Equation (1) requires that the utility of the real value
sacrificed by the individual in purchasing the asset he equal to the
conditional expectation of the utility of the real value of the benefit from
holding and selling the asset.
Equation (1) has the form of a linear difference equation that arises in
many rational expectations models. Hence, a solution that depends only on
market fundamentals can he written as
(2) f =
andsubstitution of (2) into (1) with equality of p and Pt requires A =p1.
Notice that If (1) is postulated as the entire model, an additional
arbitrary element, ht, can he added to the market fundamentals solution to
provide an alternative solution,
(3) Pt =P1E(d+1)+ b.
The model requires only that the sequence of he's possess the property that
(4) E(b+i) =Pbt,
i =
sincewith this property the solution (3) satisfies (1). The time series
is termed a rational bubble according to Flood and (arher (l9O), since it
satisfies the Euler equation (1). Absence of bubbles requires that each
element of the sequence is zero.5 The time series property of bubbles
described by (4) assures that bubbles cannot be a reason that the Euler—5—
equation (1) is deemed to he misspecified in an econometric Investigation such
as Hansen and Singleton (1952).
Since we are interested in how various variance hounds tests perform in
the presence of speculative bubbles, we take (3) as our representation of
equilibrium asset price with no additional restrictions placed on the ht
sequence other than those imposed fr (4)6
The basic insights of the variance bounds tests are that the variance of
an actual variable must he greater than or equal to the variance of its
conditional expectation and that this latter variance must be greater than or
equal to the variance of a forecast based on a subset of the Information used
by agents. in order to see how the existence of bubbles could lead in theory
to a violation of variance hounds, consider the ex post rational price. The
variance hounds literature defines the theoretical ex post rational price to
he the price that would prevail If everyone knew the future market
fundamentals with certainty and there were no bubbles. Therefore, the ex post
rational price is
(5) p =
Thetheoretical relation that is the foundation of many variance bounds





—Et(dt÷i)]is the deviation of the present value of
dividends from its expected value based on time t information. By
construction, u is uncorrelated with and ht, but p and h may he
correlated with each other.—6—
Notice in (4) that since p—i> 1, a rational stochastic bubble is
nonstationary. Consequently, its unconditional moments areundefined. For
this reason we address our arguments to variances and covariances of the
innovations of processes, which are well—defined.
Let the innovation in from time t —nhe [X —E_(Xt)J.Then the




C(X , Y)= — E(X )][Y —E (Y )j} n t t t t—n t t t—n t
where E() denotes the unconditional mathematical expectation. In what
follows we treat n as a finite positive integer.
Applying the innovation variance operator to both sides of (6) yields
(7) V(p) =V(p)+ V(ut) + V(b) —2C(p,bt),
which follows from the conditional orthogonality of Ut to Pt and bt.
Suppose that a researcher had errorless measurements of p and Pt
over a long time series and could develop very good estimates of
V(p) andV(p).7 Assume also that the researcher knows that (1) is not
rejected by the data. Since the innovation variances of u and ht in (7) are
strictly nonnegative, a finding of V(p) > V(p) could he rationalized,
within the framework of the model, by c(p, h) > 0.
In typical presentations of variance hounds tests, the stochastic bubble
is excluded from (6) because absence of hubbies is intended to he part of the
joint null hypothesis. A theoretical variance bound derived from (7) inthe—7—
absence of bubbles is V(p) > V(pt). It is easy to construct examples in
which a sufficiently large innovation variance in b causes this variance
bound to he violated. Consider the situation in which the innovations in ht
are orthogonal to the innovations in market fundamentals. In this case,
=V(h).Therefore, the right—hand side of (7) reduces
to V(p) + V(ut) —V(h),and a sufficiently large innovation variance in
the bubble could cause V(P) < V(Pt).8
We imagine that theoretical exercises similar to the above have spawned
the popular argument that the failure of variance hounds tests can he due to
speculative hubbies. Analogously, it has been argued that failure to reject
the variance bounds inequalities is due to exclusion from the sample of time
periods containing bubbles.9 We now demonstrate that this theoretical
intuition is not correct in all situations. The practical implementation of
-manyvariance bounds tests precludes rational stochastic bubbles, per Se, as
the explanation for the failure of the test.
The difference between the theoretical exercise described above and its
practical implementation arises, of course, in the constuction of an
observable counterpart toPt. In practice it is impossible to measure the
ex post rational price because it depends on the infinite future. Researchers
therefore typically measure a related variable denoted Since actual price






(8) p= Pd+i+P T' t=O,•',T—l, 1=1
in place of Notice from (5) and (5) that—8—
*T_t* T—t
(9a) Pt=Pt•_p
which implies from ()that
* T—t
(9h) Pt =Pt
+ p (bT —UT).
Since UT is the innovation in the present value of dividends between time T
and the infinite future, it is uncorrelated with all elements of the time T
information set which includes time t information. Since hT depends on the
evolution of the stochastic bubble between t and T, it is not orthogonal to
time t information.
Notice what happens when (9h) is solved for Pt and the result is
substituted into (6). After slight rearrangement, one obtains
(10) Pt =Pt+ w,
where
(11) w E u —T_t)+ (pTtb —he).
quation (10) is the empirical counterpart of (6) and forms the basis of the
usual variance hounds tests. The only important difference between our
version of (10) and that of previous researchers is that we have explicitly
allowed for rational stochastic bubbles in our derivation.—9—
Application of the innovation variance operator to (10) gives
(l) v(;) =V(p)+ V(w) + 2C(P, we).
The important point concerning (12) is that the innovation covariance between
Pt and Wt is zero. To understand why, consider the nature of the composite
disturbance term, w. First, as noted above, both Ut and UT are uncorrelated
with p1, since is in the time t information set which is a subset of the T
information set. Second, and most important, the combined term PT_tb —bt
is
uncorrelated with the time t information set even though each term separately is
not orthogonal to time t Information. This is true because Et(hT) = t)b
which follows from (4). Hence, Et(pT tbT —h)
=0,and w)
0.
Therefore, (12) takes the form
(13) V(;) =V(p)+
from which it follows that
(14)
by the nonnegativity of V(w). The important point is that (14) is derived
in the presence of rational stochastic bubbles. If the variablesPt and
are actually used, as they have been in several tests, and the inequality in
(14) is found to he violated, one cannot conclude that stochastic hubbies are
an explanation of model misspecification.— 10—
Ofcourse, research that does not use the terminal price T to
construct Pt does not discriminate among possible reasons for rejection of the
null hypothesis. The research which does use the actual terminal market price
therefore incorporates one of the alternative hypotheses into the null
hypothesis. While this may make it more difficult to reject the null
hypothesis, a reversal of the inequality in (14) cannot he attributed to
rational stochastic bubbles.
ha. The Mankiw, Romer, Shapiro Test
Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1985b) argued that estimation of the sample
variance by subtraction of the sample mean rather than the population mean
produces small sample bias in variance hounds tests. In an effort to develop
an unbiased test Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (lQR5) consider a "naive forecast"
of stock price defined by
(15) p =1P1r(d+i)
where F(d+i) is the naive forecast of dividends at time t + i based on some
information available at time t.
Consider the following identity:
* 0 * 0
(16) Pt —Pt
= — +(p —
Inorder to avoid sample means, Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1955) work with the
conditional second moments of (16). Substitute from (6) into (16) and take
conditional second moments to derive— 11—
*02 * 2 02 0 (17) Et(Pt — = Etnt — +E(p — — 2Efh(p —
Thelast termin(17) appears becausePt —= u—bt,and although u is
orthogonal to (p —p),bt is not. Notice, therefore, that the two
inequalities derived by Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) in the absence of
bubbles,






neednot hold in theory in the presence of bubbles. As in the case discussed
above, from (17) we see that if E_fbt(p_ p)12 > 0, bubbles would he one of
the reasons that the theoretical construct p could fail a second moment test.
Now consider substitution for p in (16) from (9b):
0 0
(19) Pt— Pt =p
—p)+ (p —
Sincep appears on both sides of (16), the termpTt(h —
UT)
in (9h) does
not appear in (19). From (10), notice thatPt —Pt
on the right—hand side of
(19) is uncorrelated with information at time t. Therefore, sincePt —p
in the time t information set,
(20) Et(;t —= Et(;—)2+ Et(p —— 12—






Since(21a) and (21h) were derived under the hypothesis that rational
stochastic hubbies are present in the data, rejection of the hypotheses
expressed in (21a) and (21h) cannot be attributed to the presence of
stochastic bubbles. Similarly, failure to reject the hypotheses cannot, as
claimed by Shiller (1985) in his comments on Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985),
he attributed simply to the failure to include speculative bubbles episodes in
the sample data.'1
III. A Cautionary Note in Tests for Bubbles
This section presents an example economy Illustrating an important
point. All bubbles tests are conditional on the researcher having the correct
specification of the model including the nature of market fundamentals. Flood
and Garher (1980), Bianchard (1979) and Tirole (1985) all define the bubble as
what is left over after market fundamentals have been removed from the
price. Since neither bubbles nor market fundamentals are directly observable,
one can never be sure that market fundamentals have been specified
appropriately.12 The example serves to illustrate the point in the context of
the model of the previous section.— 11—
TheEuler equation (1) may be rewritten as
(22) U'(c)z =Et{PIT'(c÷1)(z+1+ a+i)J.
Consider an economy witha+i constant at a and for simplicity assume that
aggregate output is not storable and is constant at y. With population
normalized to one, per capita consumption is simplyc =yin equilibrium. We
first solve the model without uncertainty assuming the absence of bubbles.
The solution for price is
(23) z =pa/(l—p),t=0,1,..'.
Now consider the solution if everyone knows that a government will come into
existence at T. Assume that the government will institute a tax system to
finance its expenditures and that the service flow of government goods enters
the utility function separably from the utility of private goods. Assume also
that the government will take g units of the consumption goods each period,
which lowers equilibrium consumption to c =y—gin each period from T
onwards.
The advent of the government sector raises the marginal utility of
private consumption in period T and thereafter. we parameterize this change
by writing U'(y —g)=(1+ cz)U'(y). Suppose further that the government
finance system taxes all income flows but not capital gains at the rate
so that g =Gy.After—tax income from owning an asset is therefore (l—O)a.
To determine the price of the asset in periods before T, consider first
what price must hold after the advent of the government. The first order— 14—
conditionat T is
(24) U'(Y—g)z =pu'(y_g)[z1+(l_O)al,
which has the no—hubbies solution
(25) z =p(1—O)a/(1—p),t =T,T+1,•••.
The price of the asset before T can now be determined by recognizing that
agents know at T—1 that dividends will he taxed and that the marginal utility
of private consumption will rise at T. Price must obey
(26) U'(y)z_1PU'(y_g)(z+(l_O)a),
which, from (25), implies ZT1 =(l)zT
Price falls from T—1 to T to offset
the increase in marginal utility and the incidence of taxation. Treating
ZT1 as a terminal price, wesolve for asset prices in periods before
time T—l.
The solution for asset price is
(27)z
=Apt+ pa/(1—p), t =
where
(28) A =— 15—
Theprice path prior to T—1 will rise, fall, or remain constant depending on
the sign of A which is governed by whether (1—O)(1+c&) is greater than, less
than, or equal to one.13
Now supose agents are not sure that a government will be installed at
T. Assume that their uncertainty can he represented by a time—invariant
probability itthatthe government will begin operation at T with corresponding
probability (1—it) that the government will not begin operation then or any
other time in the future.
With this change the constant term in (28) becomes
(29) A'=1Tr+(lff)(l+a)(l_O)_lJfpa/(l_pJpT_l
If the transition probability is not constant hut moves through time, a
solution for the price path is
(30) z =Iirt+(1_irt)(1+x)(1_6)_lJfpa/(1_p)JPT_t_l
+pa/(1—p), t=
whichmay vary stochastically through time in addition to its deterministic
movements.
The important point about these simple examples is that they illustrate
situations in which an expected future event produces a price path which, if
compared to the path of market fundamentals prior to the future event, appears
to he characterized by a bubble. Examination of (27), (28), (29) and (30)
indicates that asset prices correspond to the no—bubbles with constant
fundamentals price in (23) plus something else. The additional element must— 16—
fulfillthe bubble property given in equation (4) since it is in the
homogenous part of the solution. The homogenous part will he present in price
either if there are bubbles or if the no bubbles system needs to position
itself in advance of a future switch in forcing processes. The last example
as well as more complex versions would generate stochastic price pathsthat
would appear to contain stochastic bubbles that satisfy (4) even though the
examples are bubble free.
The econometric problem arises because the Investigator never knows
precisely what information is used by economic agents. Consider a naive
investigator who examined data from periods surrounding the possible
institution of the above government policies in a situation in which the
policies were not instituted. If A' in (29) is nonzero, the unwary researcher
who treated data for at as market funcamentals would conclude that the price
path prior to T contained a bubble that burst. The example, of course, was
bubble free. The problem is that at does not capture all of the market
fundamentals. The potential taxation and government spending programs also
are part of fundamentals.
The point of this section was to provide a cautionary note to the
Interpretation of bubbles research. Empirical bubbles tests must be
Interpreted either conditionally assuming an investigator has correctly
modeled market fundamentals or as joInt tests for bubbles and possibilities of
misspecIfication of market fundamentals. Perhaps the latter interpretation Is
more attractive to some researchers. It Is interesting nevertheless to
inquire whether bubble—type processes characterize the data, and if so, what
misspeciflcation of market fundamentals might he behind such a finding.— 17—
IV.ConcludingRemarks
Speculative hubbies are possible in some theoretical models and are
precluded in others. Whether they are important phenomena in actual economic
data is an open question presumably susceptible to scientific investigation.
One point of this paper is that the implementation of variance bounds
tests often precludes rational speculative bubbles as a reason for rejection
of the null hypothesis in such tests. Construction of an observable
counterpart of ex post rational price, Pt, by employing an actual terminal
market price, builds any rational bubbles into the empirical analysis.
Therefore, hubbies must he unrelated to findings that the volatility ofPt IS
greater than that of
Of course, this is not an indictment of variance bounds tests. These
tests play an important role in the econometric analysis of financial
markets. We have observed the controversy surrounding these tests and their
empirical Implementation. Our purpose is simply to clarify these tests and
their empirical implementation on one particular issue.
The second point of the paper is to provide a cautionary note to the
empirical analysis of bubbles. West (1984, 1985) has designed and implemented
theoretically correct hubbies tests. West's methodology requires an
unrejected Euler equation (1) and a forecasting equation for market
fundamentals. Interpretation of the results of such tests requires
consideration of potential changes In the market fundamentals that agents may
he forecasting. Much work has been devoted to attempts to find an unrejected
ruler equation, hut success has been elusive. Less effort has gone into
understanding how process switching can affect asset pricing tests. Both
aspects are critical to our understanding of the economics of asset price
volatility.— 18—
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1. See, in particular, Flavin (1q83), Kleidon (1985a, 19R5h) and Marsh and
Merton (1984).
2. Eichenbaimi and Hansen (1984) and Dunn and Singleton (1985) explore
alternatives that allow considerable variation In the representative
agent's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
1. Dornhusch (1952) argues that the flexible exchange rate system has not
worked well and suggests that speculative bubbles may he one of the
culprits. See Meese (1986) for a test of speculative bubbles in the
foreign exchange market.
4. Marsh and Merton (1984) use the sample average price as the terminal price
in constructing their counter example to Shiller's derived variance
hounds.
h
5. Satisfaction of a transversality condition such as lim p Et(pt+h) =0
h+
requires the absence of bubbles. Tests for speculative bubbles can
consequently he thought of as tests of this model's transversality
condition.
6. The restrictions that (4) places on the bt process are not very severe.
The time series process can take many possible forms including bubble
innovations that are conditionally heteroscedastic.
7. Tn order to simplify our argument we abstract from the sampling
distribution of the sample statistics and regard them as precise estimates
of their population counterparts.— 19—
8.Geweke (1980) notes that in linear environments a variance hounds test is
not always powerful at detecting deviations from the theory.
Since Pt =+ht from (2) and (3), and because p =p+ u from (5)
* f
and the definition ofu, V(Pt) —V(p)=v(u)
—v(bt)
—2C(p,he).
When V(u) > V(h) + 2C(p, he), the variance bound test is unable to
detect bubbles even though they are present in the data. Geweke
demonstrates that an alternative regression test is more powerful.
Frankel and Stock (1983) reach a similar conclusion but argue that
variance bounds test may be more powerful against nonlinearities in the
mlsspeciflcat Ion.
9. Shiller (1985, p. 689), in his discussion of Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro
(1985) argues that one reason one of their tests does not find excess
volatility is "that the major 'speculative bubbles' in this century of
data, that of the 1920's and that of the 1950's, are given less weight."
10. The variable Pt is used by Shiller (1982), Grossman and Shiller (1981),
and Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985). Earlier, Shiller (1981a, 1981b)
used the average market price over the sample period as the terminal price
in (8). See note 6. Kleidon (1985a) and LeRoy (1984) demonstrate that
use of Pt produces a smooth series compared to even in situations in
which the data are constructed to satisfy (1). The series look smooth
because for small k, V(p — <V(p — withthe results being
quite dramatic for highly autocorrelated dividend series. Hence, the
graphs In Grossman and ShIller (1981) are quite misleading.— 20—
11.In fairness to Shiller, his (1984) work clearly indicates that he rejects
the notion of rational speculative bubbles discussed in this paper,
although Fischer (1984) argues that Shiller's fads and fashions may
ultimately prove to he the same thing as speculative bubbles.
12. This point was emphasized by Flood and Garber (1980, pp. 749—50) and has
been reiterated by Hamilton and Whiteman (1985).
13. If U(c) =c'/(1—8), 8 > 0, then (l+)(1—O) =1and the type of price
path followed until date T—1 depends on the relationship of 8 to unity.
If 13 > 1, prices rise prior to T while they fall if 8 < 1.For
quadratic utility the relationship of (l+c&)(1—O) to unity will depend on
the scale of the economy and ratios of the utility function parameters.— 21—
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